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1 Howell  John Harris’s  magisterial  history  of  labor  relations  in  the  Philadelphia  metal
trades has provoked surprisingly little discussion thus far in the United States. Three
years after its publication, the book had garnered only a smattering of reviews by labor
historians. Indeed, the U.S. journal of record, Labor History, had yet to review the book.
Nor had this long-awaited volume by a well-known and passionate participant in U.S.
labor historians’ debates drawn the attention of scholarly symposia or sustained internet
discussion.
2 This neglect,  although undeserved,  is  in some ways understandable.  Bloodless  Victories
does not fit  easily into the mold of  “labor history”—at least as most labor history is
currently being written in the United States. This book is part business history, part labor
history,  part  history  of  industrial  relations.  As  a  result  it  conforms  to  few  of  the
characteristics most commonly found in recent labor histories, and is therefore ill-suited
to prevailing scholarly tastes. Rather than making workers its primary actors, this book
views history mainly though the eyes of employers as they struggle to control their labor
markets and keep their shops non-union. Rather than chronicling a dramatic workers’
insurgency,  it  carefully  examines  subtle  economic,  political,  and  labor  market
developments that influenced the decisions of mid-sized metal trades employers to either
fight or compromise with unions. Rather than probing the ways in which gender, race, or
ethnicity  complicate  workers’  identities,  it  practically  eschews  such  subjects  for  an
examination  of  how  competing  employers  found  ways  of  transcending  their
individualistic tendencies to make common cause.
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3 Ironically, the very features which have helped to keep Bloodless Victories below the radar
of most U.S. labor history scholars also serve to make this book one of the most useful and
authoritative  accounts  of  early  twentieth-century  American  labor  history  to  have
appeared within the last decade. To be sure, Harris’s book sidesteps the debates about
race and gender that  are currently central  to the field of  labor history (a justifiable
decision given the racial and gender makeup of his subjects). But Bloodless Victories wades
confidently into another set of debates that go to the very heart of any effort to evaluate
organized labor’s record of achievements and failures in twentieth-century America. As a
result, this is a book that demands attention.
4 Harris’s choice of the Philadelphia metal trades industry as the locus of his study is apt,
for in many ways the “City of Brotherly Love” provides a perfect setting in which to
examine  the  development  of  U.S.  labor  relations.  Philadelphia’s  metal  trades  shops
produced  a  diversity  of  labor  relations  visions  in  the  twentieth  century.  Frederick
Winslow Taylor’s scientific management theories were a product of Philadelphia’s metal
working shops. The ideas of such labor relations innovators as Morris L. Cooke, Robert G.
Valentine, and Clinton Golden were honed by their experiences with the Philadelphia
metal trades. And the United Electrical Workers, the militant CIO union that transformed
the metal trades industry in the 1930s, enjoyed its greatest strength in Philadelphia. In
addition to incubating contending labor relations visions, the Philadelphia metal trades
also left an unusually rich historical record. The MMA’s archives reveal a great deal about
the collective behavior of the city’s metal manufacturing entrepreneurs. Additionally, the
fact that many of those men came from the same densely intertwined Quaker middle-
class  makes  it  possible  to  see  how  their  shared  moral  sensibilities  and  social  ties
reinforced their cooperative approach to the labor question. Harris makes the most of
Philadelphia’s  unique attributes and records to construct a compelling narrative that
sheds light on some little understood areas of U.S. labor history.
5 One of the neglected areas limned in this volume concerns the manner of men and the
types of businesses that formed the passionate cutting edge of the open shop movement.
The hard-driving proprietary capitalists  that  led the middle-sized Philadelphia  metal
manufacturing companies often began as skilled mechanics themselves. They were, as
Harris points out, “dedicated to the gospel of work—as a moral imperative and the road to
self-realization” (60). They recruited most of their front-line supervisors from within the
firm,  and they prized loyalty among their  workers.  They were capable of  competing
aggressively against each other. But they were also drawn together by common problems,
ranging from the erratic swings in demand for their products to the sudden upsurge of
union organization among their skilled workers that erupted between 1897 and 1903.
Metal manufacturers briefly flirted with the idea of compromise with organized labor
during this period,  but they chafed under the Philadelphia Agreement that governed
relations between labor and management in the city from 1901 to 1903. The founding of
the MMA in 1903 was an outgrowth of the employers’ decision to abandon compromise
and unite to break union power in their trade. As Harris shows, the most energetic
leaders of the Open Shop movement in Philadelphia came not from the city’s largest
employers—such as Midvale Steel or Baldwin Locomotive—but rather from the middle-
sized firms whose owners were more likely to have built their businesses from the ground
up.
6 In the ensuing struggle between management and labor, the key to victory was control of
the  labor  market—a  second  neglected  subject  area  illuminated  in  this  study.  The
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employers’ most effective tool in the battle for labor market power was the employment
bureau which the MMA set up to keep records on all of the skilled workmen in the city
(including notes on their union affiliation). Although this agency did not function as well
as some of its planners hoped (due to the unevenness of the employers’ data keeping),
during  labor  conflicts  it  effectively  delivered  a  steady  supply  of  skilled  non-union
workers to shops on strike. One of Harris’s most interesting findings is that Philadelphia’s
skilled workers’ unions found it impossible to keep their own members from using the
MMA’s  employment  bureau  to  locate  work  during  times  of  rising  unemployment.
Combined  with  the  occasional  employment  of  labor  spies  and  injunctions  issued  by
sympathetic courts, the labor bureau and some convenient recessionary periods helped
the MMA drive unionism from Philadelphia’s metal working shops in a series of battles
between 1905 and 1911.
7 Despite the natural advantages employers enjoyed in their successful battle with trade
unionism,  the  stability  of  Open  Shop  Philadelphia  was  not  enduring.  World  War  I
triggered developments that even the MMA could not control. The war tightened labor
markets in a way that gave workers leverage; it introduced dynamics that eroded metal
employers’  tightknit  solidarity;  and it  saw the federal  government intrude into labor
relations with mediation efforts that ultimately enhanced union organizing. By 1918 the
Open Shop was in retreat.
8 Had the war lasted longer, it may have destroyed the Open Shop altogether. As it was, not
only did the MMA’s Open Shop ideal survive the war, in many ways it emerged from post-
war  labor  struggles  improved  and  enhanced  by  a  war-born  reform  vision.  By  the
mid-1920s, the MMA had modernized its approach under the leadership of a new group of
moralistic  Quaker  businessmen,  most  notably  Morris  E.  Leeds.  The  revitalized  MMA
became a leading force for welfare capitalism in Philadelphia.  It  promoted personnel
management techniques, built ties with researchers at the University of Pennsylvania’s
Wharton School, developed a training program for skilled workers, and brought the city’s
larger employers such as Disston and General Electric into its fold. By 1929 the MMA’s
Open Shop vision, now reformed and retooled in light of the labor upheavals of World
War I, seemed more secure than ever.
9 But the Great Depression and the New Deal pulled the rug from under the reformed MMA.
The  group’s  futile  efforts  to  rally  its  members  around  a  voluntaristic  response  to
unemployment  were  abandoned within the  first  few years  of  the  depression and its
training  programs  and  promotion  of  welfare  capitalism  collapsed.  Lacking  credible
alternatives, the MMA embraced elements of the early New Deal in hopes that it could
replace economic chaos  with order.  But  the stimulus that  Roosevelt’s  administration
provided to trade unionism soon converted the MMA into a zealously anti-New Deal
organization. And between 1933 and 1936 the MMA spent more than ever before to battle
trade unionism. Ultimately, though, the MMA accommodated to what it could not change.
Ever the hard-nosed realists, its members accepted collective bargaining when no better
alternative seemed available. Rather than championing the traditional Open Shop, the
MMA’s post-1937 mission was to help its members make the best of the new situation,
limiting  union  power  and  resisting  government  intrusion  wherever  possible  without
fighting the idea of collective bargaining itself.
10 The account of how the MMA first resisted and then accommodated itself to the New Deal
Order is likely to be seen as the most significant contribution of Harris’s book in years to
come. His analysis of this process in turn addresses three large interrelated questions
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that together provide a basis for evaluating twentieth-century U.S. labor history: to what
extent was the union renewal of the 1930s primarily the product of grass-roots labor
militancy? What role did the state play in the process of labor reform? And what was the
significance for workers of the labor regime that emerged in this period? Each of these
questions has elicited energetic and often passionate scholarly debate in the past. Harris
weighs in on them with characteristic clarity and his judgements, rooted as they are in a
finely detailed understanding of Philadelphia’s employers, command attention.
11 Harris  argues convincingly that Philadelphia workers’  militancy and self-organization
“followed  rather  than  preceded  state  encouragement  and  endorsement”  (356).
Furthermore,  he  dismisses  the  contentions  of  Staughton  Lynd  and  some  New  Left-
influenced labor historians who have suggested that the emergence of “bureaucratic”
CIO-style industrial unionism stifled a more radical grass-roots style of worker militancy.
The union institutions that emerged from the 1930s did not so much muffle militancy as
channel  it,  Harris  argues.  Industrial  unions  were  the  product  of  the  realization that
“militancy required strategy,  direction,  and discipline” and “to keep what  it  won,  it
required institutionalization” (357).
12 In Harris’s estimation, the orientation of government—local, state-level, and federal—was
in turn crucial  to trade unionism’s breakthrough in Philadelphia.  He argues that the
election of a liberal mayor and a liberal state government, together with the New Deal’s
labor  policies,  were  decisive  in  undermining  the  Open  Shop  in  the  mid-1930s.  “The
cumulative effect” of employers’ “experiences at the hands of the city, state, and federal
governments was to make the MMA rethink the wisdom of the belligerent course it had
pursued,” according to Harris (402).  New Deal era governments at the local,  state,  or
national levels were scarcely the handmaidens of capital—rather the state provided a
crucial force “bearing in to crush the Open Shop” (397).
13 What then was the significance of the great shift in labor relations that occurred in the
1930s? Harris’s argument here rejects the contentions of Colin Gordon and some other
recent commentators who have emphasized the degree to which employers accepted and
even valued the logic of collective bargaining, exploiting unionization to both stabilize
competitive  labor  markets  and  restrain  autonomous  shop-floor  militancy.  To  the
contrary,  the  MMA  staunchly  resisted  unionism’s  advance,  Harris  contends,  until  it
became clear that labor’s advance simply could not be rolled back. “The pressure of an
apparently  unstoppable  labor  movement  enjoying  widespread  public  support”  and
“increasingly  effective  governmental  backing”  finally  helped  to  persuade  the  MMA’s
leaders that “the time for adopting a new approach that was more in keeping with the
requirements” of the “unwanted New Deal Order” had arrived (405). None of the MMA’s
members, had wanted the New Deal collective bargaining system, Harris tells us, but all
more or less accepted it. To be sure, the collective bargaining regime did in some ways aid
the MMA’s historic mission of rationalizing the labor markets of Philadelphia’s metal
trades, and employers could console themselves with this. But the rationalization that
came through collective bargaining cost employers more in terms of the loss of individual
autonomy and power than they would have been prepared to tolerate had they had it in
their power to do otherwise.
14 The  implications  of  Harris’s  analysis  are  obvious:  it  was  not  that  workers  won  a
“counterfeit” victory in the 1930s,  one that  employers  helped to influence and even
engineer. Rather, workers’ gains came over the energetic opposition of employers who
would have preferred a far different dispensation.
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15 Its  members  having made their  reluctant  peace with the New Deal  Order,  the MMA
turned  to  the  task  of  better  equipping  them  to  influence  and  limit  the  collective
bargaining regime. That was a much longer and more complex battle—it was also one that
the MMA would ultimately win, though the contest would take decades to play out. In the
end  the  MMA—through  its  successor  organization,  the  Mid-Atlantic  Employers’
Association (MEA)—outlived the New Deal Order. And, as Harris notes in an afterward to
the book, the remnants of the employers’ association movement are today presiding over
a  the  virtual  collapse  of  the  collective  bargaining  regime  and  the  vibrant  union
movement whose aggressive organizing had called the employers’ movement into being
at the dawn of the 20th century.
16 Harris’s tale is occasionally overly dense. And at times it tells us simultaneously too much
about Philadelphia’s metal manufacturing entrepreneurs and too little about the actual
effects that their policies had on wage rates and labor market structures in their industry.
But the relatively minor flaws in this ponderous volume are more than redeemed by the
broad vision that informs it and that fact that its narrative is told with great heart, keen
wit, and an amiably combative style.
17 Bloodless Victories is a book that in many ways defies easy categorization. Yet, as Harris
notes, it is ultimately “a book about power” (1). Few recent labor historians have grasped
the dynamics of labor power more surely nor revealed its contested history as well as
Harris. Scholars would be wise to pay attention to the arguments of this important book.
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